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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to assess the patterns 
of bureaucratic-military relationships which developed 
during the period of military government in Ghana and 
Nigeria following the oouns d'etat of 1966* It was 
found that the patterns differed between the two count­
ries. In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military worked 
closely together during the entire period of military 
government. In Nigeria, the military and the bureauc­
racy worked closely during the first period of military 
rule, but the bureaucracy was replaced in governing 
positions by political figures in the military govern- 
ment that took over after the second coun»
It is suggested that the difference in patterns 
of military-bureaucratic relations was due primarily 
to the attitudes held by the military toward politics 
and politicians. It is further suggested that the 
difference in attitudes was due to three factors:
1 ) patterns of alienation of the military and 
the bureaucracy which developed during the 
pre-coup period;
2 ) the events of the immediate post-coup period;
3 ) the type of problems facing the military 
governments.
11 i
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Of these , it appears that the latter was the most import­
ant factor in the determination of the differing atti­
tudes of the military toward politics and politicians.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Ghana and Nigeria experienced coups d * etat in 
1966 which resulted in military governments replacing 
civilian governments in both countries. Although in 
each case the obvious effect of the coup was to remove 
the civilian politicians from power, it is less clear 
what changes took place in the relationships between 
the remaining leadership groups. It is the purpose of 
this paper to examine the relationships which existed 
in both Ghana and Nigeria between the military, political 
and bureaucratic leadership groups prior to the coup, 
and attempt to assess the impact that the changes in 
regime brought about by the coups had on the relation­
ships between the key elite groups during the period 
of military government.
This examination will be carried out chrono­
logically. First, the paper will examine the patterns 
of interaction between the political and bureaucratic 
leadership and between the political and military 
leadership prior to the coups in Ghana and Nigeria.
The purpose is to point out influences or patterns of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
action which might contribute to the establishment of 
a close co-operation between the military and the 
bureaucracy. Second, the paper will focus on the 
patterns of interaction between the military and the 
bureaucracy which occurred after the removal of the 
political leadership by the coups in an attempt to 
determine the similarities suid differences between 
these patterns of bureaucratic-military interaction 
in Ghana and Nigeria. In this context, the paper will 
examine the relationships in two time periods: (1) 
during the first six months after the coup; and (2) 
in the more formal period of military government 
which followed this initial six month period. Here 
the discussion will trace the development of relation­
ships in these countries as conditions stabilized, 
and will attempt to point out how both the events of 
the initial period and the subsequent problems faced 
by the military governments contributed to the de­
velopment of the relationships.
While there have been numerous studies focus­
ing on the role of the military or the bureaucracy in 
political development, the importance of the relation- 
ships between the groups, and the determinants of 
these relationships, has not generally been stressed.
Ghana and Nigeria present two instances where the 
development of bureaucratic-military relations in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Dost-couD military governments may be studied.
In each country, a definite pattern of bureaucratic- 
military relations developed. Since the patterns were 
quite different, it will be the purpose of this paper 
to explain how these differences occurred.
In general, the major reasons given for the 
close co-operation between the military and the bur­
eaucracy have emphasized the common background and 
attitudes of the two groups. Some of these specific 
binding ties mentioned have been: 1) that the military 
and the bureaucracy represent the most westernized 
and professional groups in the society; 2) that in 
ex-British colonies, both groups were British-trained 
and thus influenced by common professional social­
ization patterns; and 3) that both groups have similar
1
attitudes towards politics and politicians. The 
first two propositions appear to be supported by the
1
Among numerous authors reflecting these 
viewpoints are:
S.P. Huntingdon,Political Order in Changing 
Societies(New Haven:Yale University Press,1969lChT4 
A.Perlmutter,"The Praetorian State and the 
Praetorian Army ‘ * C o i a par a t Ive Fo 1 i t î c o 1 (3,1969 )n.‘^P,h
F. Heady, Public Administration:a Comparative 
Perspective (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
19%6)pp77-78.
L.G. Cowan,"The Military in African Politics" 
International Journal XXI(3,i96o)p293
E. Feit,"Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria" 
World Politics XX(1,1967) nassim.
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close working relationship which developed in both 
Ghana and Nigeria during the immediate post-coup 
period, but fail to account for the subsequent diff­
erences in patterns of relations which developed.
The third proposition, that of common attitudes to­
ward politics and politicians is likewise important, 
but it is important in the fact that different atti­
tudes existed especially on the part of the military 
in the two countries.
Attitudes toward politics and politicians 
on the part of Ghanaian and Nigerian military offi­
cers differed in two crucial respects ; 1) in the 
level and uniformity of alienation felt toward the 
political structures; and 2 ) in the degree to which 
political and bureaucratic groups were to be permit­
ted to participate in the military government. These 
crucial attitudinal differences were not solely the 
product of pre-coup relationships between the three 
groups, but were also affected by the events of the 
actual removal of the civilian regimes and the subse­
quent initial periods of military government, and 
perhaps more importantly, by the nature of the pol­
itical problems which faced the military once they 
had assumed power.
The different types of military-bureaucratic 
relationships which developed in Ghana and Nigeria
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
following the eouos are clearly the result of a number 
of causal factors. In an attempt to explain the dif­
ferences in these relationships, this paper will 
focus on three major areas* 1) the development of 
attitudes on the part of the military and the bureau­
cracy toward the political sphere during the pre- 
coup period; 2) the way in which the actual events 
of the COUPS and the immediate post-cpup period effected 
the availability of various groups to participate in 
the military governments; and 3) the manner in which 
the differing political problems confronting the 
military governments of Ghana and Nigeria were reflected 
in the pattern of relationships which developed.
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CHAPTER II
PRE-COUP INFLUENCES ON 
BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS
In Ghana and Nigeria, the civilian bureau­
cracy and the military reflect both the influences 
of colonial background and the experiences of these 
institutions during the period of national independ­
ence* This chapter will examine some of the effects 
of these influences in the pre-coup period on the 
military and the bureaucracy as institutions and on 
the relationships between the two groups,
Prior to Ghana’s independence, the structure 
of colonial government ensured the close co-opera­
tion between the civil service and the security forces 
2
of the colony* Within the colonial structure, both 
the colonial bureaucracy and the security forces, as 
the only organized structures, were implicitly charged
2
Throughout this paper, the terms security forces 
and military will be used interchangably to mean both 
the military per se and the police as a para-military 
unit. For the rationale of including the police in the 
military, see J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order 
(Londons Institute of Strategic Studies,I9 69)pp28-31,65-70.
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7with the maintenance of colonial security, both in- 
ternally and externally. Both carried out the role 
of policy-application agencies, implementing the 
directives of the colonial hierarchy. In addition, 
they acted together to maintain internal security, 
with the civil service fulfilling the intelligence 
gathering role, and the security services the inves­
tigative and control functions. Thus within the prime
role of system maintenance, the two services were
3
forced to work closely together.
The same basic pattern was reflected in Ni­
geria, but one special problem arose which mitigated 
the chances of the same close relationship developing, 
Prior to 1951» the colonial civil service in Nigeria 
had been a unified service, fulfilling the same sec­
urity maintenance role as had the civil service in 
Ghana. As a unified service, there was a fluidity of 
the movement of personnel between regions, which per- 
mitted the possibility of ethnic clashes. This was 
due both to the prevalence of southerners in the 
civil service, a result of the merit system of re~ 
eruiting, and to the stated policy of not allowing 
civil servants native to one region to work in their
3
On the primacy of the maintenance role, see 
A.L.Adu, The Civil Service in Commonwealth AfricafLondom 
Allen and Unwin,1969)Ch,l.
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8home region. With the formation of the federal system 
in 1951» the well-developed educational system around 
Onitsha led to an increase in the number of Easterners
entering the civil service of the central government,
4
as well as the western and northern civil services.
The process of decolonization had major effects 
on both the roles and structures of the bureaucracy 
and the military in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, the 
process resulted in altering the functions and goals 
of both these structures, and in the necessity of 
Africanizing the two groups. In Nigeria, the process 
also led to changes in goals and functions, as well 
as Africanization, with the additional problem that 
the federal nature of Nigeria required the repatri- 
ation of posts to citizens native to the region(termed 
northernization, westernization,easternization or 
regionalization).
In both the military and the civil service 
in Ghana, the movement toward independence meant an 
increase in the demands by Africans for major roles 
within the institutions of the country. To satisfy 
these demands, and to enable the country to control
4
D.J. Kingsley,"Bureaucracy and Political 
Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria" in 
J . Lapalombara(ed) Bureaucracy and Political Develop­
ment (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,I963) 
pp.311-313.
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its own civil service and military, the process of 
Africanization was expanded. The Ghanaian goal was 
complete repatriation of the positions concerned by 
1957* This process had begun in 1946 with the aboli­
tion of the favoured racial basis in the civil serv­
ice, and was extended in 1949 by the cessation of
5
expatriate recruiting for the administrative services. 
In the military, the process of Africanization of 
officer positions started during the Second World War, 
with some Ghanaians being granted temporary commi­
ssions. However, the first permanent,or Queen *s,comm­
issions were not granted until 194?, while a regular
officer’s school was not formed until the Teshie
6
school was formed in 1953» By 1957» 12.8% of the
7
officer corps was Ghanaian , while complete African­
ization was finally attained in 19&3. The Africani­
zation process in the civil service progressed from 
13.8% of the senior service African in 1949 to 38.2%
8
in 1954, with almost complete Africanization by i960.
A.L. Adu, Civil Services, p .131
6
Lee, African Armies p.41
7
ibid, p.44
8
D. Austin, Politics in Ghana. 1947-1960 (London: 
Oxford University Press,Tq^4jpV365
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10
In Nigeria, the process of Africanization
dates from the 1952 appointment of a Nigerianization
9
Commission, and their recommendations in 1953» By 
1957» a Nigerianization Officer had been appointed 
to accelerate the recruiting and training of Niger­
ians for the public services. In 1959?however, a 
committee of the House of Representatives adversely 
reported on the work of this officer because, among
other reasons, only 10 of 73 superscale posts were 
10
Nigerianized, By I96I, however, the rate of Nigerian­
ization in the federal service had increased greatly, 
with 64% of the senior posts being filled by Nigerians 
in 1962. Because of this increase, Nigerianization 
ceased to be regarded by the public service commiss-
11
ion as a problem of major concern to the legislators.
In Nigeria, the removal of expatriates was slower 
than in Ghana, due to a policy which created nev/ 
posts for these expatriate advisors, mostly in tech-
9
Taylor Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition" in 
R.O.Tilman and T.Cole(eds) Nigerian Political Scene 
(Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press,1962)p,104
10
Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition" p.l05 
Superscale posts include those of Permanent Secre­
tary, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Senior Assist­
ant Secretary, the top three levels of the Civil Service.
11
Cole,"Bureaucracy in Transition"p.I05
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11
nical fields and in the northern region, where the 
political leaders preferred expatriates to southern 
Nigerians.
Table I
Progress of Nigerianization 
At Permanent Secretary Level
Region Eastern Western Northern
1958 1 of 11
1959 3 of 13
1961 11 of 13 11 of 11 1 of 11
1963 __ _13_qf 13_ 4 of 11
Although the above table includes only the 
permanent secretary level, it is apparent that the 
rate of progress was substantial in the eastern and 
western regional services. At lower levels(superscale 
and scale A salary grades), over half of the 558 posts 
in the eastern regional service had been held by 
expatriates in 1952* By I96I, only 92 expatriates 
remained. In the north, the pace of progress was 
slower because of the demands for Northernization 
rather than Nigerianization. At the superscale level, 
of 100 posts, only 38 were held by Nigerians in 19&3, 
while 33 were held by expatriates, and the remaining 
29 posts were vacant. At the federal level, the pace 
of Nigerianization was fairly slow until i960. At 
that time, only 32% of the superscale posts were held
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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by Nigerians. Ey I963, however, Nigerians held 77%
12
of these posts, with the rest held by expatriates.
Within the Nigerian military, the first Queen's 
Commissions were granted to Nigerians in 194?, and 
by i960, 15.1% of the officer corps had been Niger- 
ianized. This slow rate was the result of demands by 
the federal structure for the maintenance of an eth­
nic balance in the officer corp. These demands meant 
that suitable candidates could only be admitted within
13
their regional quota. With the low number of northern 
Nigerians applying, this meant a slow rate of growth 
of the Nigerian officer corp. By January,I96I, three 
months after independence, there were only eighty- 
one Nigerian officers, an increase of twenty-four, 
but still a small number compared to the more than 
eight hundred expatriate officers. The formation of 
officers schools in the north helped to redress the 
balance, and increase the number of officers in the 
military. By I965» the majority of the officer corps
12
Data from : Kingsley,"Bureaucracy and Poli­
tical Development" pp310-311; A.Adedeji,"Training 
for What?:a Review of the Development and Problems of 
Administrative Training in Africa" Public Administr­
ation 47(4,1969)pp454-457
13
See V.C. Ferkis,"The Role of the Public Serv­
ices in Nigeria and Ghana" in P. Heady and S. Stokesfeds) 
Papers in Comparative, Public Administration(Ann Arbor: 
Institute of Public Administration,1962)pp202-203
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15
was Nigerian, with expatriates still serving in
14
staff and training positions on a contract basis.
The changes in role and function of the 
civil service and the military also affected the 
future relations between the two groups. In both 
Ghana and Nigeria, the approach of independence
meant the imposition of a political superstructure
15
on the existing institutions. This resulted in 
a change in the character of the roles of the in­
stitutions from one of a static,systems-maintenance
16
nature to one of a dynamic, supportative nature.
This change resulted in an alteration of priorities. 
Under the colonial system, th^ primary function of 
these institutions was one of service of the col­
onial office, and was priamrily one of rule applica­
tion. During the shift to an independent state(occur- 
ing in Ghana between 1951 and 1957, and in Nigeria 
between 1954 and 1960), the priorities changed to the
14 .
W.M. Gutteridge, The Military in African 
Politic5(London:Methuen, 1969)pp69-7l'
15
See D.Apter, Ghana_in Transition(New York: 
Methuen,1965) and P. Blitz(ed.) Government and Politics 
in Nigeria(London:Sweet and Maxwell,1905) "for goherai 
treatments of this process.
16
See M. Fainsod,"Bureaucracy and Modernization: 
The Russian and East European Case" in J. LaPolambara(ed) 
Bureaucracy and Political Development pp.256-257 regard­
ing the dynamic supportative role.
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service of the government, and by extension, of the 
people, becoming more multi-functional with the
addition of new departments, and changes to the scope
1?
of old departments. This alteration required the 
inclusion of highly-educated young men in the two 
institutions, bringing with them different conceptions 
of the role of the public services in the two countries.
The effects of Africanization and changes in 
role and functions of the military and the bureaucracy 
are easily shown. The rapid pace of Africanization 
compounded by changes in the structures and functions 
of the governments of these states prior to independence 
required an immediate injectfoh of new,educated young 
men into the upper levels of both public services.
These men, entering the public service, either military 
or civil, came into contact with senior ranks who had 
been trained and socialized in the patterns of the 
British model. Further, the pre-independence mainenance 
of British standards meant, for the military, further 
training at military Schools in England, and conformance 
to the standards of these schools. For the bureaucrat, 
entry into an expatriate-dominated bureaucracy meant 
compliance with the standards of the expatriate.
17
R.L. Harris,"Effects of Political Change on 
the Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria" 
Administrative Science Quarterly 15(5,1968) pp586-404
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In both cases, the results were that observance of high 
standards of professional conduct were required of these 
future elite members, and were adopted by these members, 
as their own standards. The common standards of pro- 
fessionalism acted as the basis for future relations 
between elite groups.
Following independence both the bureaucratic 
and the military elites in Ghana and Nigeria were 
forced into patterns of action which did not conform 
to the standards adopted during the pre-independence 
period. In Ghana, this was mainly the result of 
political structure, while in Nigeria, it may be traced 
to problems of regionalism and ethnicity.
In Ghana, the Congress People's Party, (O.P.P.) 
led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, gained the position of 
government party during the colonial period, and, 
when elected Prime Minister, Nkrumah led Ghana to indep­
endence. The basic British structures were maintained, 
but during the entire period of Nkrumah's rule, the 
base of political and social activity was located within 
the O.P.P.. As Bretton noted, this political machine 
built by Nkrumah "hollowed out the existing Structure
(of state institutions) then proceeded to crush the
18
remaining shell". This was done by altering the
18
H. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah 
(New York: Praeger, 1933T p p T 6-7.
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political structure, uniting the positions of head of 
state and head of government in the office of president 
by proclaiming a republican constitution in 196O. By 
this constitution, all structures of government were 
subordinated to the president. To complete this move, 
the creation of a single-party state in January 1964 
vested all powers in the life chairman of the C.P.P., 
who also happened to be president.
These constitutional changes and amendments had 
two basic effects on the civil service. By the constit­
ution of i960, "the appointment, promotion, dismissal 
and disciplinary control of members of the public
19
service is vested in the president." This article
had the effect of opening the service as a source of
patronage, with the Civil Service Commission stripped
of all influence. In addition, the merit basis of
the service v/as removed, allowing for political appointment
and promotion within the civil service. This allowed
the meshing of the C.P.P. and the civil service at all
levels. The bureaucracy became an extension of the
president’s office, reduced to "mere administrative
20
mentalities" of the presidency. . The informal structure
19
Article 51» Section 2 of the Republican 
Constitution. For the full text, see Apter, Ghana 
in Transition Appendix A.
20
Bretton, Rise and Fall, p. 10?.
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of the C.P.P. within the civil service became the 
means for enforcing the president’s wishes upon all 
levels of the service, and also became the upward channel 
of communication to the president’s office.
The bureaucrats were removed entirely from the 
formulation of policy. Policies were made on the 
basis of highly personalized, ad hoc decisions by the 
president’s office, with the bureaucrats reduced to the 
role of programming and executing the policies handed 
to them. If it was possible for bureaucrats to be 
purely administrative, then the role performed by
Ghana’s senior bureaucrat; under Nkrumah’s regime
21
came close to being so. For 'bureaucrats trained and
educated in the British tradition, and who would have
accepted British standards, this could only have resulted
22
in the bureaucrats becoming opposed to the C.P.P..
Because of this opposition, many trained administrators 
chose to leave Ghana, preferring to work for international 
organizations rather than the C.P.P..
However, most bureaucrats chose to remain in 
Ghana, working within the restricted role allowed them 
by the political machine. Nkrumah allowed the profess-
21
Harris, "Effects of Political Change" p. 393.
22
Bretton, Rise and Fall Chapter VI and Harris, 
'Effects of Political Change" pp. 392-393*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18.
ional civil servants in the npper levels of the hurean- 
cracy to disregard the Party, and perform these limited 
functions, for it was in this way that he hoped to
23
isolate the powerful members of a group he distrusted.
Until I9&O, the military had been fairly free 
of political interference. From 196O until the coup, 
however, the security services were continually alienated 
by Nkrumah. In July,i9 6 0, the power to make all military 
appointments was granted to the president by the new 
constitution. Closely following this event came the 
involvement of Ghana in the Congo Crisis.These have 
been generally accepted as the starting points for the 
deterioration of relations between the president and the
25
army. Relations between the police and the president 
generally seem to have deteriorated from August,1962, 
until the coun in February I966. Nkrumah, who was convinced
23
Bretton, Rise and Fall, pp.11^-117
2k
Within the context of this paper, the termaalien- 
ation is used to refer to the process by which persons 
or groups become disaffected. That is,the process by 
which a neutral or active support group or person is 
changed into a gro'up or person in conflict with the 
source of discord. In this case, it means the process 
by which the military and the bureaucracy wore dis­
affected by the political regime. In this paper, alien­
ation, disaffection and estrangement will be used 
interchangably to refer to this process.
25
Gutteridge, Military in African Politics.p.100
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that the security branch was no longer reliable after
an attempt on his life in August, decided to form a
national security service responsible to the president
26
only. This move humiliated the police, and a second 
attempted assassination by a police constable led 
Nkrumah to purge the top ranks of the police.
The army was faced with a similar situation.
The formation of a Bureau of Military Intelligence in 
1961 under the command of a diplomat, transferred to the 
military with the rank of lieutenant-Colonel, aroused
27
considerable resentment in the army. The appointment 
of this former diplomat, a fellow tribesman and friend 
of the president, meant that informants linked to the 
presidential security system were being introduced. 
Additionally, the formation of the President's Own 
Guard Regiment(s) (P.O.G.R.), an elite force composed 
of volunteer Ghanaians under the direct control of the 
president extended the army's resentment, especially 
since the P.O.G.R, were advised by east Europeans, in 
contrast to the British orientation of the rest of the 
army. As well, these regiments were given the best 
equipment and uniforms while the regular army was poorly
26
Bee, African Armies p. 6 .^
27
A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coun (New York, 
Humanities Press, I966) pp. 100-102,
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28
clothed and supplied.
The formation of this independent parallel 
system thus alienated the existing security forces, 
by posing a threat to the traditions of the services 
involved. These traditions were further threatened by 
the continuing politicizing moves by the president who 
required all officers to be members of the C.P.P., 
and all officers to attend the party ideological institute 
at Vfinneba.
In Ghana, both the military and the civilian
bureaucracy were alienated by the political superstructure.
The bureaucracy was supplanted by the party apparatus,
while the military position was reduced by the imposition
29
of parallel structures, both actual and embryonic.
In each case, the role which the institution was 
expected to play was less than the role which the members 
of the respective elites considered proper. Thus two 
alienated groups existed, the regular military and the 
civil service. These groups could co-operate on the 
basis of this alienation, and on the common standards 
of the groups.
In Nigeria, the basic situation differed greatly
28
Afrifa, The Ghana Coun passim.
29
Gutteridge, Militarv in African Politics,
p. 105» The * embryonic groupé'refers to the Worker's 
Brigade and the Young Pioneers, who could be used by the 
C.P.P. as enforcers.
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from that of Ghana, There existed no one dominant party 
in the Federation. This made it improbable that the 
institutions of the bureaucracy and the military would 
be politicized by the actions of a single person or group. 
There could be no creation of parallel structures to 
extend personal influence into the lower levels of these 
institutions.
In Nigeria, the government of each region was 
in the hands of a dominant, tribally-based political 
party. The central government, however, was controlled 
by a coalition of the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.)
30
and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) 
Between January I965 and the coun in January I966, 
the central government was controlled by a national 
coalition embracing all four major parties. The regional 
power base of each party provided the opportunity for 
each party to maintain control by the purchase power 
of public funds, jobs, contracts, licenses, etc.. The 
bureaucracy was limited to programme formulation and 
management, and the role of policy advisor. However, 
this latter role was circumscribed by the political 
dominance of the party in the region. Additionally,
30
The other major parties included: the
Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), west and 
mid-west regions; The Action Group (A.G.) western region; 
the Northern Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U.) an 
N.C.N.C. ally in the north.  — .
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the rate of political interference in programme management
was fairly high, since the prime aim of the programmes
became a source of patronage. This had been the situation
since before independence, and had become so blatant
31
that commissions of investigation were initiated.
In the regions, the boundaries of bureaucratic respon­
sibility were highly circumscribed by the unwillingness
of political entities to surrender the opportunity for
32
political and personal gain.
In the central government, the respective 
compositions of the political and bureaccratic elites 
led to the same circumscription of responsibilities.
Where northerners dominated the political structure, 
and easterners dominated the bureaucratic structure 
there appeared to be a formality of communication 
between the minister and the higher civil servants.
While the political decisions would be supported, there 
appeared to exist on the part of the ministers a tendency
to work around rather than through the senior bureaucrats,
33
thus reducing the role of the bureaucrat.
31
Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition" nassim.
32
R.B. Harris "Role of the Civil Servant in West 
Africa" Public Administration Review, 29 (December,
1965) pp. 30G-313.
33
V.A. Olorunsola "Patterns of Interaction between 
Bureaucratic and Political leaders: A Case Study"
Journal of Dcvcloninv Areas III (k, I968) pp. 5I-6 6.
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In both the central and regional governments,
it has been suggested that the bureaucracy was alienated
by the tendency on the part of the political elite
to by-pass the bureaucrat. This suggestion rests on
the assumption of inter-tribal competition or distrust.
Thus in the central government, the positions of the
northern politician and the eastern bureaucrat would lead
to this situation. In the west and midwest and eastern
states, the competition would be lessened due to the
34
tribal matching of politician and bureaucrat.
In Nigeria, military alienation was not as 
manifest as it had been in Ghana; however, the regional 
basis of parties implied a competition for the support 
of the military. Tensions within the army existed
35
between northern and southern officers as early as I96I,
This demonstrated the intrusions of political-ethnic
considerations into the army, which would tend to
alienate those trained or educated in the British
36
pattern and who had accepted British standards.
The primary ethnic ties of the members of the military 
elite allowed the extension of political competition
34
Olorunsola, "Patterns*' pp. 64-66.
35
Bee, African Armies,' p. ??.
36
P. Herring "The Future of Democracy in 
Nigeria" in Tilman and Cole, Nigerian Political Scene
p. 259»
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into the military. Identification would therefore be 
not with the federal government, but with regional 
parties. It appears that this problem may have been 
magnified by the quota system of recruitment which 
may have encouraged close regional ties.
While not as overt as the Ghanaian situation, 
the Nigerian situation before the coup still led to a 
partial alienation of both the bureaucracy and the military. 
The regional identification, corruption and political 
stagnation of the independence period would have 
alienated these groups which were trained to expect 
high standards. As in Ghana, the bureaucracy filled 
a reduced role, one in which an administrator would 
feel handicapped. The use of the military to solve
internal political problems in the mid-west would only
37
have led to a lack of confidence in the politicians.
Finally, the police had been exhausted and confused in
38
their attempt to control the break-down in the west.
To generalize, by the end of I965» the military 
and the civil bureaucracy in both Ghana and Nigeria 
had been alienated by the holders of political power
37
Lee, African Armies p. 168.
38
It is noticable, however, that the police 
were considered a truly national force in 1968 and I969 
at the peace talks between the Federal Military Govern­
ment and the secessionist eastern region, as noted in 
Africa Report for 1968-1969.
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in their respective countries. In both countries, these 
alienated groups could co-operate on the basis of their 
alienation and on the basis of their British standards. 
Additionally, the common structural features of the two 
institutions meant the small elites of these two groups 
were easily identifiable, and the implications of high 
positions in these structures would instil confidence 
in the abilities of the holders of these positions.
The stage was therefore set for the coups.
The military, disaffected by the imposition of political 
norms on its basically non-political standards, with a 
self-image as the protector of the state, could move 
to correct this disaffection. The bureaucracy, on the 
other harid, circumscribed and partially politicized, 
could only retreat into routine, waiting to take its 
proper role in the administration of the state.
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CHAPTER III
EFFECTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
ON BUREAUCRATIC-MILITARY RELATIONS
In addition to the varied patterns of alien­
ation which had developed in Ghana and Nigeria, both 
the act of deposing the civilian regimes and the pro­
blems encountered by the military governments in the 
period immediately following the coups likewise con­
tributed to the development of different patterns of 
bureaucratic-military relationships. The events of the 
COUPS influenced the ability of various leadership 
groups to participate in the subsequent military gov­
ernment. Possibly more important, however, to the dif­
ferences in patterns of relationships were the events 
of the immediate post-coup period.
In the COUP of February 24,1966, the Ghanaian 
military acted as a unified group to topple the 
Nkrumah regime. Planned and executed by the security 
forces, the take-over of power was accomplished with 
a minimal loss of life, and minimal disruption of
26
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routine. The credit for the planning of the coup was
39
claimed by many groups and individuals, but it now 
appears clear that the coun was the work of four men: 
Colonel E.K.Kotoka of the Army and Commissioner J.W.K. 
Harley of the Police, assisted by Major A.A,Afrifa 
and Colonel A.Ocran, commander of the Accra Garrison.
The date chosen was after President Nkrumah's depart­
ure for a trip to Hanoi and Peking, because it was
40
assumed that his absence would minimize the bloodshed.
The mechanics of the coun were fairly direct.
In order to mislead the informers of the Security 
Branch, an exercise was planned for February 23rd on 
the pretext of practising for the invasion of Rodesia. 
The battalion at Tamale moved to join the brigade at 
Kumasi. On the evening of February 23, the brigade 
moved to Accra and, in the early hours of the morning 
of the 24th, attacked and captured the radio station 
and other key points in Accra, There was little resist­
ance except from the P.O.G.R. at Flagstaff House
(Nkrumah's residence) and this was quickly put down.
41
Only seven of the attacking force were killed, as 
was General C.M. Barwah, the General Officer Commanding
39
See Daily Times (bagos) Feb. 27,28,1966.
40
W.M. Gutteridge, The Militarv in African Politic: 
(London:Methuen,1969)p-i09'
41
See Ghana Today, Feb.24,196?.
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Ghanaian Forces, who had refused to support the Icad-
42
ers of the caup. By 6:00 A.M., Colonel Kotoka 
announced over the radio that "the myth surrounding 
Nkrumah has been broken. Headquarters were establ­
ished at the police station, and an effective govern­
ment with General A. Ankrah at its head established.
In the Nigerian case, the original assump­
tion of power by the military on January 15-16,1966  
can scarcely be called a coup d'etat. In form, it 
appeared more a mutiny of some officers in Kaduna, 
Ibidan and Lagos. The timing of the move was such 
that these 'plotters* in Kaduna were able to kill 
Sir Amhadu Bello, the northern Premier^ 8.A. Akintola,' 
the western FPemier, and Brigadier Ademulegun, one 
of the more senior Nigerian officers, and were able 
to arrest the northern regional Governor, In Lagos, 
seven people, including the Prime Minister, Sir Abu-
bakar Tafawa Balewa, and five senior officers were 
44
killed. The government was ordered dissolved, all 
gatherings were prohibited and the Constitution sus-
42
A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (New YorksHuman-
ities Press, 1966)p.l04
43
ibid. p.35
44
Government Statement of the Current Nigerian 
Situation (LagosiFederal Ministry of Information,I9 66) 
p.3 hereafter referred to as Government Statement
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pended by Major C. Nzeogwu, the prime architect of 
the mutiny. However, these orders were ignored by 
the Government in Lagos, and the Cabinet met on the 
evening of the 15th» At this meeting, it was agreed 
that the government would be handed over to the senior 
member of the military. General A. Ironsi, the next 
day. On the 17th, Major Nzeogwu,in Kaduna, surrendered 
his dubious position, and declared loyalty to the 
Federal Military Government, Thus the group which 
attempted the coup had been unsuccessful because of
45
the "intervention of the bulk of the Nigerian Army", 
However, the army still appeared as the most unified 
group capable of carrying on the Nigerian State, 
so it was to the upper levels of this group that 
power was given.
In each case, the events of the coup reflect 
the pattern of alienation to which the military had 
been subjected. In Ghana, the security forces,with 
the exception of those units directly under the pres­
ident's control, had suffered misuse and abuse, both 
actual, and in the light of the plans for Rhodesia, 
potential. Coupled with economic stagnation and the 
deterioration of the political superstructure, this 
produced a unified force which was able to act in
45
Government Statement p.3
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concert to remove the president and the party, and 
assume the reins of government. In Nigeria, on the 
other hand, only certain parts of the military had 
been alienated. The dominance of family and regional 
ties on the individual officer can be seen to have 
resulted in a close correlation between the degree 
of alienation of the individual officer and his eth­
nic or regional status. This correlation may be less­
ened by other influences such as service in colon­
ial forces, age, or professionalism. In General Ironsi's 
case, influences such as these may have reduced his 
support for the officers engaged in the original 
disturbances. Thus the officers from the eastern 
region, or of eastern tribal background, would be 
alienated by the attitudes of northerners towards 
eastern people living in the north, and by attitudes 
of northern leaders toward the eastern region. Under 
these conditions, highly alienated eastern officers 
would be the first to take action. The identification
of fourteen of the leaders of the January 15th mutiny
46
as "members of a certain ethnic group", identifiably
47
Ibo, bears out this suggestion. The actions of this 
group against mainly northern,or northern-supported,
46
Government Statement n .3*
47
Gutteridge, Militarv in African Politics,p.?5
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leaders reflects the direction of this alienation. 
Officers of other ethnic or regional backgrounds, who 
would not have been as alienated, supported their lead­
ers, choosing to remain within the bounds of military 
discipline.
The results of the coup differed only slightly
in the two countries.In Ghana, the immediate aim of
the COUP had been the elimination of Nkrumah and the
C.P.P.. Thus the police and the special branch of the
Criminal Investigation Division rounded up all those
v/ho had been connected with political leadership. These
included all members of the legislature, all senior
Flagstaff House officials, and all C.P.P. branch off- 
48
icials. This effectively removed all politicians from 
consideration as members of the military government.
In Nigeria, although Parliament was suspended, few 
politicians were arrested, although some were put into 
protective custody, and then released within a few days, 
It may have been regarded as unnecessary to arrest 
the politicians, since except for Dr. Michael Okpara, 
Premier of the eastern region, all well-known or high-
49
ly Influential politicians had been killed in the coun.
48
Africa Confidential #5&6, March 4 and March 18,1966
49
Also excepted were Chief 0 . Awolowo, Chief A,
Enharo and other prominent A.G. leaders in prison.
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In the Nigerian case, neither the events of the eon.p 
nor the patterns of alienation led to the elimination 
of the ability of politicians to participate in govern­
ment, However, the leaders of the Ironsi,government did 
not accept politicians into the government, ordering 
all politicians to their homes nending the investiga-
' 50'
tion of charges of corruption^
Although the events of the coups differed, the 
subsequent military governments were very similar. In 
each case, the constitution of the country was suspend­
ed, and all power was assumed by the military.The mil­
itary excluded all politicians from government, handed 
control of all levels of administration to the civil 
servants, and delegated to senior bureaucrats the re­
sponsibility of purging the ranks of the civil service, 
and of maintaining standards of competence within gov-
51
ernmentr The relations between the military and the 
bureaucracy in the two countries were virtually iden­
tical. In Nigeria, this pattern contributed to the 
downfall of the Ironsi regime, while in Ghana, the 
same pattern contributed to the success of the mili­
tary government.
50
B .J , Dudley, Part'es and Po1i1101ans in Nort- 
orn Nigeria.(bondonzPrank Cass and Co,,196dJppix-x,
.51
Daily TiT':es(T<rnT's) Jan.16,1966. Also Gutteridge, 
Milnta/'y in Afrieay! Po!U.iirgrppl11,113
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In Ghana, the military and the bureaucracy 
worked closely together to rebuild confidence in the 
state. Following the coun, and the removal of parallel 
structures of the C.P.P., the leading bureaucrats were 
given ministerial powers by the National Liberation 
Council(N.L.C.). With the expressed aim of eliminating 
inefficiency and corruption, the N.L.C. and the bureau­
cratic ministers initiated a reorganization of the
52
structures of government. Under this reorganization, 
the number of ministries was reduced from 32 to 18,
and the number of administrative districts from 168
, 53
to 4 7. Civil servants were appointed to regional and 
district administrative committees to replace politi­
cians, and city and local councils were replaced by
54
management committees composed of civil servants. 
Additionally, the Civil Service Commission was recons- 
ituted to ensure job security and equitable treatment 
of civil servants, and to protect them from the vagaries 
of any future leadership.
Following the change in regimes in Ghana, the
52
I. Markovitz, "Ghana Without Nkrumah", Africa 
Report (April,1966)ppl0-15
53
General A.A. Ankrah,"The Future of the Military 
in Ghana" Africa Forum 2(2,1966)n.11.
54
Markovitz,"Ghana Without Nkrumah" p.13
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scope of the civil servants' duties was greatly expanded.
From purely administrative roles, senior bureaucrats
were brought into the inner circle of policy-making,
55
not only as advisors, but as final policy-makers.
Although this would not appear to be the case if only 
the structure of the military government was assessed, 
the nature of the military leadership, and the nature 
of the concepts of government held by the military, set 
the psychological boundaries of the bureaucratic role.
The original N.L.C. acted as a collegial head of govern­
ment in Ghana. By this structure, the N.L.C. as a whole 
was responsible for the government. The Cabinet Secre- 
tariat set up was along the lines of a staff planning
56
body that included expert advisors from the ministries.
Thus the military recognized the bureaucrats as inval­
uable sources of advice and assistance. Since the mil­
itary view of leadership was limited, they were more 
willing than their political predecessors had been to 
delegate responsibility. Bureaucrats, as experts in 
their fields, were delegated complete responsibility 
for their decisions. Within the broad scope of effic­
iency and rationality laid down by the N.L.C., and in
55
Africa Confidential #6 March 18,1966
56
M .Janewitz. The Militarv in the Political 
Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chi- 
cago Press,1962) p.8?
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fulfillment of the primary goals of economic recovery
and moderate socio-economic reform, the bureaucrats
both formulated and executed policy.
In the field of primary concern, economic re-
57
growth, the Economic Council, led by Mr. N. Omaboe, 
the Government Statistician whose repeated warnings 
of impending economic disaster had been ignored by the 
previous regime, acted as a composite economic policy­
maker for Ghana. This can be seen in the statements 
of March I966, and in the subsequent budgets of the 
N.L.C., in which the guidelines outlined for the re­
construction of the economy stressed elimination of 
those items which Mr. Omaboe had been most critical 
during the Nkrumah regime: over-expenditure, prestige
58
projects, the development plan and the state enterprises.
As noted, these quasi-ministers were given com­
plete internal control of their own departments, a 
broadened scope which included both programme formu­
lation and planning, as well as a co-ordinated imple­
mentation. In the re-organization of the ministries and
the allocation of priorities, the civil service directed
59
its own affairs. As previously noted, the Cabinet
57
The other members of the Council included Mr. 
A. Adamokoh, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, and Mr. N, 
S. Amagashie, Mr. Omaboe‘s deputy.
58
Africa Report(July I966) p . 36
59
Africa Report(November,I966) p.18
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Secretariat was re-organized to consist of senior bur­
eaucrats chosen for their professional ability. In the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reduction of embassies 
from 60 to 13» and the removal of the politically or­
iented civil servants was carried out completely by 
the senior members of the ministry. Foreign relations, 
the prime resposibility of General Ankrah as head of 
the N.L.C., were developed and maintained entirely 
by a committee composed of four prominent civil ser-
60
vants. The scope of this ministry v/as considerably
widened by the return of African Relations to the Min-
61
istry.
With the removal of political organizations, 
the bureaucracy was also given the role of maintaining 
contact between the people and the government. As men­
tioned, local and municipal councils were reconstituted 
to consist of civil servants. The replacement of pol­
iticians by these civil servants at all levels meant 
that the only line of communications or feedback from 
the people to the military existed in the civil service. 
This line was supplemented by the increasing criticism 
of the newspapers and the intelligentsia, whose members
60
West Africa Annual I967 p.85
61
These had been handled during the Nkrumah 
regime by a special office in Flagstaff House. Since this 
was the prime concern of the Ministry, only European 
and international organizations had been left to the 
Ministry.
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had returned to Ghana following the coun to assist in 
the work of reconstruction® This voice was mainly 
negative, however, and the civil service tended to he 
the voice of support for the military*
In Ghana, the bureaucracy and the military 
worked closely together* Possibly unconsciously, the 
N.L.C. acted to relieve the alienation felt by the 
bureaucracy during the previous regime. By broadening 
the scope of responsibility, the N.L.C. removed the 
prime reason for this alienation. Further, by its de­
pendence on civil servants during this early period, 
the military government was able to utilize the expert­
ise of this group for the satisfaction of the prime 
problems of the regime. These actions by the military
predisposed the bureaucracy to aid in the maintenance
62
of military rule.
In Nigeria, as in Ghana, the formation of the 
military government in January,I966 resulted in the 
close co-operation of the military leadership and the 
bureaucracy. Following the removal of the politicians 
from government, bureaucrats were given the same powers 
given their Ghanaian counterparts. As in Ghana, the 
Supreme Military Council acted as a collegial head of
62
F.G. Burke,"Public Administration in Africa", 
Journal of Comparative Administration 1(3>1969)pp352-354.
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government, and at the federal level,the senior bureau­
crats were given the task of cleaning out political 
appointées within a reduced structure in order to put
63
an end to "waste and extravagance in public expenditure'.' 
Public corporations in Nigeria were siiniliar to those 
in Ghana since they were a source of political patronage 
to the parties. Furthermore, they were both expensive, 
and for the most part, inefficient. Within two weeks 
of the coun, these public corporations were reconstr­
ucted to remove political appointées, who were replaced
64
by civil servants.
On February 1,1966, Mr. P.O. Nwokedi, formerly
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, 
was appointed Commissioner on Special Duties "to study 
and report to the Supreme Military Council on the est­
ablishment of an administrative machinery for a United 
Nigeria, and on the unification of the public services
65
and judicial services of the Federation." The appoint­
ment of a civil servant to investigate such an area of 
prime concern to the government shows the amount of 
trust and co-operation expected of the bureaucrats.
In the regions, a similiar pattern of action
63
Daily Times(Lagos) January 29,1966
64
News From Nigeria February 19,1966 p.l?. Also 
the Economist,February 11,1966
6<j
News From Nigeria February 19>1966 p.l
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took place. Ih the western region, the executive council
consisted of the Governor, the senior military commander,
the police commissioner and six permanent secretaries
from the regional public service, although other permanent
secretaries could be co-opted. A number of committees
and boards were purged of political appointees and restaffed
with primarily senior civil servants, although some academics
66
were included on specialized boards. In the mid-west,
the executive council consisted of two military, one
police and five senior civil servants. The number of
boards and commissions was reduced from seven to five,
and the number of ministries from twenty to eleven.
Civil servants, by decree, were given full powers of
control over the positions -. boards or ministries -,
6?
to which they were assigned. In eastern Nigeria, the
changes were equally sweeping. The number of ministries
was reduced from fifteen to twelve, the appointment of
all board chairmen and members was revoked, and these
68
were replaced by senior employees of these boards.
In northern Nigeria, the pattern differed slightly, but 
it was noticeable that almost all of the appointed civil
66
Daily Times (Lagos) February 17, 1966.
67
Daily Times (Lagos) February 2, I966 p. 16.
68
Daily Times (Lagos) February 16, 1966 pp.2,8,9.
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servants were northerners, while many 'clean* politicians 
were also brought inAo government in a consultative
69
capacity.
One noticeable difference between the treatment 
of civil servants in Ghana and Nigeria was the reliance 
of the Ghanaian leaders on the civil service as a whole. 
In Ghana, the civil service was given carte blanche to 
rationalize its own structure and maintain the profess­
ional standards expected of it. Nigeria, on the other 
hand, this reliance was not as evident. In both ;the 
east and mid-west states, the military governors publicly
70
denounced the lack of discipline in the public service.
In the mid-west the governor went even further, looking 
tbe doors of all public offices at starting time, and 
arresting all those late for v;ork. This type of treat­
ment was reflected in the criticism received by the civil 
service in the press, which became so critical that
General Ironsi v/as forced to call on the press to stop
71
the attacks.
In Ghana, the pattern of co-operation between 
the military and the bureaucracy laid the groundwork for
69
Skurnik, W. "Nigeria in Crisis" Current 
History vol. 54 (230, 1968) p. 146.
70
Daily Times (Lagos) January 19, I966 p.l.
71
News from Nigeria, Juno 1, I966,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41.
the alliance of these two groups and the solution of
Ghana's problems. In Nigeria, however, this same pattern
contributed to the downfall of the Ironsi regime, on July
29th, 1966. This can be attributed to two basic differences
between Ghana and Nigeria? 1) the nature of support
for the military government, and 2 ) the nature of the
problems facing the military government.
In Ghana, the people were fairly unified in their
support of the miltiary government. Further, the people
72
of Ghana were, for the most part, highly integrated.
The bureaucracy would have been representative of the
nature of the people, reflecting their unity. In Nigeria,
on the other hand, support for the military government was
of a less unified nature. Despite the one-Nigeria ethic
of the military leaders, the identification of leadership
was tribal rather than national, and the quality of support
73
varied within regions. Because of the predominance of 
easterners in the top levels of the bureaucracy, this 
structure would magnify, rather than minimize the split in 
support along ethnic lines.
72
D. Austin, "Saviour with a Sword; II" Now 
Society 'March 10, I966 p. 97 and K. Irvine, "Ghana 
after Nkrumah" Current History 52 (30?» 1967) p. 150.
73
See Africa Renort and Africa Confidential
during the period January I966 to July 1966 regarding 
variation in support.
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In Ghana, the nature of the bureaucratic-military 
alliance matched the nature of the problems and the 
methods of solving the problems facing the N.L.C. during 
this period. The problems, as previously noted, were 
primarily economic, requiring direct government action 
which, because of the goals involved, could be carried 
out on an administrative basis. Because there were no 
manifestations of opposition, the military would regard 
this alliance as successful.
In Nigeria, the initial problems of waste and 
corruption were successfully attacked by the military- 
bureaucratic alliance. However, in attacking the main 
problem, the nature of the Nigerian state, this alliance 
failed. The measure of success in this area can only 
be assessed on the basis of the amount of opposition 
to the policies resulting from the alliance. By its 
very nature, the military-bureaucratic alliance worked 
on the basis of consultation among members leading to the 
policy decision, with the expectation of automatic siiMport 
from those affected by the policy. Decree 34 (1966) 
of May 24, 1966 established a unitary state as a trans­
ition to a new constitution. An executive decree formed 
by the consultation of the professional public servants, 
this administrative instrument, and the nature of the 
decision-makers, did not match the political nature of 
the problem. The close relations of eastern military
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and eastern bureaucrats meant that this decree appeared 
to other Nigerians as the extension of the rumoured 
Iho domination. This resulted in attitudes of fear and 
resentment In the minds of the other Nigerians, and
75
led to the riots of May and June,1966» fu addition, 
the failure of the military governs nt to revoke the 
decree in the face of this opposition reflects the 
nature of the alliance between the military and the 
civil servants.In effect, the nature of the alliance 
did not allow for the conciliation of the demands for 
change. In this situation, there would appear no alter­
native to the non-easterners except mutiny and counter- 
coun. Thus the nature of the alliance, the support 
for the Ironsl government, and the problems faced 
by the Ironsl government were contributory factors 
to the northern-led counter-coun and the changes In the 
pattern of relationships which subsequently developed.
74
While It Is recognized that the Supreme Council 
of the Federal Military Government was formed on a 
cross-tribal base, this rests on the assumption that 
it would bo assumed by northerners that General Ironsl 
would be more affected by the eastern officers. This would 
be Identified with the rumoured Ibo domination.
75
Government Statement p.3. also Dally Times(laGos) 
June 2,1966
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CHAPTER IV
CUREAUCRATIC-KIEITARY RELATIONS DURING 
THE PERIOD OP MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
To this point, I have suggested the common 
patterns in Ghana and Nigeria which set the stage for the 
close working relationship between the bureaucrat and 
military officer. This chapter will discuss the differences 
in the patterns of relationship which followed the initial 
period of military rule, and will assess the qualitative 
differences between the Ghanaian and Nigerian experience.
In Ghana, following the initial period of exper­
imentation and dislocation, the military and the bureau­
cracy worked closely together to solve the underlying 
problems of the country. Fortunately, these problems 
had been relatively few. The primary problems were those 
of an economic nature, and posed the greatest challenge 
to the N.L.C.. At the time of the coup, the economic 
problems consisted of inflation, unemployment, over­
expenditure and mismanagement in the public sector, and 
were of such magnitude that the Ghanaian economy was 
on the verge of bankruptcy in the international economic 
system. These problems wore all closely inter-related, 
and policy aimed at the solution to each part of the 
over-all problem of economics had to be co-ordinated.
A A .
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One of the major problems, having both internal 
and external consequences, was inflation, which had ueen 
a problem in Ghana since I960. The cost of living in 
Accra, for example, had risen from an index of 100 in 19&0 
to 136 in 1963, 153 in 19&^^ 196 in I963 &no ^0^ in
76
January 1966. During the same period, the inflationary 
pressures in the economy had reduced the purchasing 
power of the oedi (^) so that local produce so^o in
Accra had almost doubled in price between 19&^ and 1966 
(119 - 226). Compounding this, wages had stayed constant
in the public sector, with the last pay raise in that 
sector occurring in i960.
The second aspect of the economic difficulties 
facing the N.l.C, was unemployment and underemployment. 
Although unemployment figures for Ghana are highly 
questionable prior to 1966, the N.L.C. estimated that 
at the time of the coup, 12# of the labour force was 
unemployed. This situation would intensify if not 
solved fairly rapidly. The rate of movement from rural 
to urban centres was fairly high, and the numbers entering 
the work force from school were greater than the increase
ill jobs in the stagnant economy « Thi c. created a social
problem, and a potential political problem, since it was
76
This section abstracted from the Quarterly
Review of Ghana, Sierra bonne, Ggmhia and T,Tbvrf[a. 
TEconomist Intelligence Service)196? - 1968 andAfrica 
Renort vol. 8, I966.
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the unemployed and poorly educated from which Mkrumah
77had dr&wn the hulk of the C.P.P. support.
A supplementary problem was that of under-employ, 
ment, uneconomical employment, or disguised unemployment, 
The number included under this heading varies, but did 
include most employees of state enterprises, the members 
of the worker's brigade, and those for whom positions 
had been made in the public service.
The third and fourth aspects of the economic 
problems facing the N.L.C. are closely connected. At 
the time of the coun. Ghana's national debt had reached 
860,1 million cedis. Of this 395*3 million 0 or  ^ 280 
million, was in external debt. The long torn debt 
amounted to E 123 million, while the medium term debt
amounted to 2 155 million, the bulk of which was due
78
by 1971* The cause of this debt had been massive 
deficits in the budgets of the last five years. With 
the numerous prestige projects, and the high import 
rate, this external debt had risen from 38,4 million 
0 in 1963* In the same period, as can be seen in the 
table below, the high levels of deficits in the budgets, 
added still :!:ore to the problem.
77
Bretton, Rise and Pall, pp. 43, 44,
7Î
Ghana Today vol. 11 y4 April 19* 1967, p. 5«
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TABLE II
79
REVENUE, EXPENDITURE AND DEBT 
In riilllon Cedi
1963 1964 1965
Revenue
Expenditure
Deficit
165.0
265 .4
10Ô.4
293 .4
377.4  
84.0
284. Ô 
361.6  
77.6
External Debt 
Total Debt
38 .4
313.3
246.8
670.7
378 .4
785.5
The N.L.C. was also confronted by the fact that 
choices of policy instruments to combat the economic 
problems were severely restricted. To reduce the deficit 
would require either raising revenues, or lowering 
expenditures, or a mixture of the two. Increasing rev­
enues would necessitate either higher taxes or higher 
revenues from the foreign sector. However, in 19&5 Ghana 
enjoyed the highest tax rate in West Africa, so that 
raising taxes was effectively removed as a policy weapon, 
Higher revenues, on the other hand, were dependent on 
factors outside the control of the N.L.C.. Ghana, an 
agricultural exporter, was a price taker, unable to 
set its own price for exports. Thus the revenues from
this export market were uncertain. There was a third 
option, however. This was the external financing of 
the debt, but this also was, at the time of the coup
79
Quarterly Review,passim
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barred from the policy arsenal. The size of the external 
debt left by Nkrumah, and the depressed state of the 
economy, had resulted in an international lack of con­
fidence in Ghana's ability to pay its debts. However, 
since this last measure was the only one both certain 
and acceptable,.the primary concern of the N.L;C. became 
the rebuilding of international confidence through the 
efficient management of the domestic economy.
The second general problem faced.by the N.L.C. 
was that of political reconstruction and purification.
The coup had been aimed at the corrupt personal party 
machine of Nkrumah, the C.P.P.. Thus the second aim of 
the military government was to restructure the political 
environment of Ghana to preclude the possibility of 
such a machine once again taking control of the country. 
To accomplish this, the N.L.C. viewed the major goals 
as the construction of a constitution which would balance 
the powers of the three sectors of government, and the
removal from the political arena of the influence of 
80
the C.P.P.. Therefore, the aims were the moderate econ­
omic reform , and the building of the infra-structure
81
of a democracy which had been lost.
80
R.L. Harris," Effects of Political Change on the 
Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria" 
Administrative Science Quarterly 13(3»1968)p.398•
81
Ghana Today March 23,1966,p.4,
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The prospect of the attainment of these aims 
meant the return to civilian rule. The N.L.C. had com- 
mitted itself to this return both at the time of the 
coup, and at various times during the period of cons­
olidation of rule. In effect, the N.L.C. had three 
goals: rehabilitation of the economyipurification of 
the political system; and, return of power to civilian 
hands. To assess the bureaucratic-military relations 
in Ghana, it is necessary to investigate not only the 
degree of success of the N.L.C. in meeting their goals, 
but more importantly, how and why the N.L.C. was able 
to maintain the alliance with the bureaucracy.
The solution to the first set of problems, the 
economic, was undertaken under the direction of the
Economic Committee of the N.L.C.. As outlined by General 
82
Ankrah, the reconstruction of Ghana's economy would ■ 
take place in three steps:
1)'emergency'action to avoid international 
bankruptcy and re-establish Ghana's credit;
2 )'consolidation'to rid the economy of its in­
ternal problems; and
3)'preparation for development', laying the 
firm groundwork for expansion and growth.
The emergency period would cover the period between the
82
Speech on Ghana Radio, March 15,1966, as reported 
in Daily Times(lagos) March 17,1966.
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COUD and the introduction of the N.L.C.'s first budget 
(July 1,1966). During this period, the economic committee 
and the N.L.C. were to take measures to drastically reduce 
imports and other drains on foreign reserves. The 
consolidation period was to include the first full year 
of military rule. In fact, this period lasted until 
August 1967* &nd was to include a reorganization of 
the public sector to place this sector on a firm basis.
The private sector was to be induced to expand and 
diversify, laying a ground work for the lessening of 
Ghana's dependence on one crop. The third period had 
no time limit, and included the organization and co­
ordination of al] economic enterprises. The successful
initiation of this step was to be the determinant of the
83
return to civilian rule.
Both internal and international measures had
to be taken in order to re-establish international
confidence in the Ghanaian economy. The primary step
required was the drastic reduction and eventual elimination
of the deficit in the budget. The N.L.C., because of the
84
economic conditions previously noted, had no choice 
but to restrict government expenditures to the minimum
83
Condensed from the I967 ^hite rarer on Economic 
Affairs reprinted in Ghana Today August 11, I967,
84
Supra, p. 42'.. A*.
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possible. This policy was initiated during the 'emergency* 
period, and continued throughout the rule of the N.L.C..
As shown in Table III, the expenditures in I966 were sharply
reduced from the I965 level (Table II), and the rate of
85
increase of expenditures was also reduced.
TABLE III
o
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN MILLIONS OP CEDIS,
Year I966/67 1967/68 I968/69 19^9/70 0:
Revenue 230,9 241.5 34o,4 375.7
Expenditures 268.4 301.I 303.8 302.7
Balance -37*5 -59.6 +36,8 +73'0
eluded the re-organization of the government. Ac noted 
in the previous chapter, the number of ministries was 
reduced from 32 to 18, and the size of these remaining 
ministries reduced. As shewn in Table IV, every area of 
government was affected in both current and Capital 
expenditures.
G 5
Unfortunately, these figures may be somewhat 
misleading on the reduction in the rate of increase 
due to devaluation of the cedi and the introduction 
of the Now Cedi.
86
Statistics abstracted fro:,i Or u'terlv Rcvi.ev; 
for 1966 - 1970.
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TABLE IV
87
.1931 Ï9&& 1967
Cur- Cap­ Cur- Cap­ Cur­ Cap­
rent ital rent ital rent ital
3^ rvioe Mn.^ Mn.NC Mn.MC Mn.NC Mn.NC
Defence 24.6 5*0 2274 3.1 29.3 4.5
Administration,Jus­
tice and Police 52.4 19.9 38.0 2 .6 42.9 5.5
Education 67.9 11.3 55.1 4 .2 62.7 5.8
Health 21.7 1.9 13.9 0.7 15.9 0.7
Other Social Services 30.4 27.4 23.0 9.0 21.2 15.5
Agriculture and non-
mlneral resources 24.5 22.5 19.8 7.4 19.8 6.4
Fuel and Power 6*4 19.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.9
Manufacturing and
Construction 4.5 31.5 3.7 20.7 6.7 20.3
Transportation, Storage
and Communications 8.4 18.4 6.5 5.6 7.7 5.4
Other 22.7 .8 ._9_ 21.2 .9,2 ._2j W 4 .2
Total 263^% 170.2 20:1^6 164.8 230..9_ 70.2
These reductions in expenditure resulted from the clos­
ing down of state enterprises of a non-viable nature,
88
the slowing down of other projects, and the re-organ­
ization of inefficient state enterprises.
In order to reduce the drain on the reserves 
of foreign currency, import licences were restricted 
to only those having clear need, such as manufacturers 
needing raw materials or enterprises needing new equip­
ment. Furthermore, tight controls were placed on dom­
estic credit in an attempt to reduce purchases of im-
87
Statistics abstracted from Quarterly Review,1966-68 
88
These latter projects included the harbour at 
Teraa, the Volta River Power Project and a number of roads.
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ported non-essentials» These measures resulted in a
significant reduction in the deficit of trade in I966
and 1967, and a surplus on the export-import balance 
89
in 1968c It should be noted that these measures were 
combined with changes in both type and value of the 
currency, with the cedi(^) being replaced by the New 
Cedi(NO) in February, I967# In July,1967* the New Cedi 
was devalued in an attempt to encourage exports and 
reduce imports*
The major problem in the foreign sector, however, 
was the outstanding debt. As noted in Table II above, 
the total external debt had reached 378.4 million Cedi, 
or £ 280 million. Of prime concern was the medium term 
debt, amounting to £155 million, which was due within 
five years. Because of the measures outlined above, and 
the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, the 
N.L.C. was able to cover most current and arrears pay­
ments on short term debt. This helped re-establish 
international confidence in Ghana, enabling the N.L.C. 
and the countries to whom the medium term debt was 
owed to arrange an agreement satisfactory to both parties. 
Under this agreement, a two-year moratorium was granted, 
allowing the N.L.C. to use the funds which otherwise
G9
Export-Import balances in million ^ or NO,
1963:-43.2 1966:-59.2
1964:-13.3 1967*-19.9
1965:-93 '2 19681+29.1
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G .aid have been used for debt payment in the rebnild- 
/ing of the economy and the clearance of outstanding 
-nort-term debts. Also, the medium-term debts were 
'rescheduled, extending the time required to repay the 
'.debts.
The reduction in government expenditures, while 
primarily aimed at reducing the budgetary deficit, had 
rooth beneficial and detrimental side-effects. The 
second facet of the economic problem facing the N.L.C. 
had been massive inflation. ITie dominant causes of this 
inflation had been the method of financing the budgetary 
deficit and the expenditures on prestige projects.
As is noted in Table 11, the internal debt had risen 
'faster than the external debt. With the decline in 
international confidence, the Nkrumah government had 
been forced to finance this deficit internally. Loan­
able funds had been scarce, and the independant business­
man who was able to borrow was forced to raise prices 
in order to cover the cost of the borrowing. In addition 
to this reason, the direction of government expendi­
tures contributed to the inflationary spiral. As is 
apparent in Table IV, capital expenditures were high. 
These capital expenditures had been for non-economic 
prestige projects, such as Job 400( the O.A.U. Council 
Hall in Accra), the Ghanaian airline, and the shipline. 
These expenditures poured money into the Ghanaian economy
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forcing prices higher. As these expenditures were re­
duced, the pressure on prices was .reduced, and the 
price level started to fall. By I967, this price level 
had fallen to I90 from 205 in I966.
These reductions had detrimental effects. The 
other facet of the economic problem had been the high 
unemployment rate. In I966, the N.L.C. estimated that
90
there were over 100,000 seeking employment. These 
figures did not include those in the Worker's Brigade, 
or those underemployed in state enterprises. As the 
prestige projects were stopped or completed, the 
workers on the projects were added to the ranks of the 
unemployed. As operating costs were reduced on other 
enterprises, more people who had received their jobs 
as patronage, and who were surplus or redundant, were 
also fired, adding still further to the problem.
A second detrimental effect of austerity was 
the loss of business confidence. As import licences 
were restricted, a number of firms closed down because
91
of the shortage on imported goods. Further, other ' 
businesses closed down because of the lack of either 
patronage or legitimate government contracts. These
90
Ghana Today April 19,196? p.5»
91
As noted in West Africa and the Economist 
during this period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
business closings meant a reduction in work opportunity, 
further adding to the unemployment' problem. Neither the 
effects nor the problem were attacked directly, but it 
was hoped that the general improvement of the economy 
would solve them. By I968, the reopening of rmmy state 
enterprises as co-operative government-private enter­
prise firms absorbed some of the unemployed, and in­
duced other private firms to open or expand.
In the solution of the second set of problems, 
the political, the N.L.C. originally set its goals as 
theelimination of the C.P.P. and the return to civil-
92
ian rule by 1968. The first policy was to bar the
1 r» a n*P -Pin A  1 -i cr ca?"* 4
W  ^  -U wt_ W  « i. -A- W>A ^  k-f W  ... "«X * .k - al» UU * J L W  -A. /> •* V' ' • «W «A. * fc V»S .
subsequent civilian government in Ghana; the second 
aimed at ensuring that the people of Ghana could not 
be subjected to the control of a single party again.
To attain these goals, the N.L.C. used the organization 
of government to direct the political future of Ghana.
The collapse of the personal party machinery of 
the C.P.P. did not mean the removal of the C.P.P. from 
Ghana. Since C.P.P. membership had been fairly wide­
spread, a purge of all members of the proscribed party 
would have been neither moral nor equitable, since some 
people, in order to gain promotion or a position, or 
to operate a business profitably, had been forced to
92
Radio Ghana Broadcast by General Ankrah March 3,
1966
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become members of the party. Investigations were held
to verify the individual members' political purity,
but the main drive was against those who had held an
office in the party.
Those members of the C.P.P. who had engaged in
corrupt practices were regarded in two categories. The
first, those who had received gifts from the President
or some other highly placed official, were ordered to
return the gifts to the state. These included such things
as automobiles, houses and land. The second category
included the gift givers. These were, if still in Ghana,
arrested and tried for corruption. As well, all those
who had held a seat in the National Assembly as a C.P.P.
member or had supported the C.P.P. in the Assembly were
barred from holding political office in Ghana for a
■period of ten years dating from the return to civilian 
94
rule. These included even those C.P.P. politicians 
who had disagreed with Nkrumah and left Ghana before 
1966, such as K.A. Gbederaah. By this ban, the N.L.C. 
ensured that there would be no resurgence of the C.P.P. 
in Ghana.
93
See Bretton, The Rise and Fall noteably those 
chapters on the C.P.P.
94
These included all members of parliament, party 
district leaders, region leaders, or members of the C.P.P. 
governing bodies, also teachers at the ideological institute.
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Although the original commitment to return to 
civilian rule had been taken by many to be the standard
95
speech of military rulers, the transfer to civilian 
rule on September 1,1969 meant the fulfillment of tlie 
commitment made by General Kotoka the day of the coun.
The return to civilian rule followed a period of re­
vitalization of politics in Ghana,
With the end of the emergency period of econ­
omic stabilization, the formation of a constitutional 
commission, headed by Chief Justice Akofo-Addo, was 
announced on September 1,1966, and held its first meet- 
on November 4,1966. While,this may have appeared 
as if it were only to placate critics, the commission 
held public hearings throughout Ghana, and worked closely
96
with the political committee of the N.L.C., After 
fifteen months of work, the commission submitted a draft 
constitution to the N.L.C. on January 26,1968, which 
was published January 29,1968. At the same time the 
constitution was published, a 140 man constitutional 
assembly was authorized. Its purpose was to study the 
draft, and to submit a final draft for electoral approval.
95
Such as in D. Austin,"Saviour with a Sword"
New Society March 10,1966 p.22
96
The political committee consisted of former 
members of opposition parties, chaired by Dr. K.A. busia. 
This committee was appointed July 1,1966 to assist the 
N.L.C. on political matters. However, it was powerless.
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Since this assembly was to be elected, an electoral 
commissioner was appointed. Following the appointment, 
a firm schedule for return to civilian rule was ann­
ounced over Radio Ghana May 22,1968, By this schedule, 
the electoral commissioner was to conduct the regis­
tration of voters beginning September 1,1968; elections 
to the constituent assembly on a non-partisan basis 
were to be held in May,1969, the ban on politics lifted 
in June,1969 and the new constitution to by completed 
by August 1,1969,with elections for the civilian gov­
ernment to be completed no later than September 30,1969, 
The elections were held August 29,1969, and the military 
stepped down on September 1, I969,
While these events were taking place, other hints 
of the strength of the commitment to return to civil 
rule were evident. On June 30,196?, the structure of the 
N.L.C. was changed to include a national executive 
council (N.E.C.) and a national advisory council(N.A.C.), 
The N.E.C. consisted of the top three men in the N.L.C. 
and thirteen civilian(bureaucrats) commissioners with 
ministerial responsibility, charged with the direction 
and control of government, a field previously held by 
the N.L.C. alone. The N.A.C. consisted of this group 
plus fifteen appointees chosen to represent the various 
groups in the society, including chiefs and women.
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On October 23, 196?* following a series of
strikes. General Afrifa stated over Radio Ghana that
the N.L.C. would continue to rule only if it received
97
a mandate at the polls. During July, August and Sept­
ember, a public opinion poll, said to be the first held
98
in a country under military rule, was conducted by 
an independent polling agency. Its findings were pub­
lished on December 2,196?, expressing the general opin­
ion that the N.L.C, should return power to civilians 
by 19?0. On December 9*Generals Ankrah and Afrifa pub-
lically supported this opinion, and restated the
99
commitment of the N.L.C..
The N.L.C. was able to meet its goals and com­
mitments. [Mrs return to civilian rule meant that the 
N.L.C. considered that the political structure envis­
ioned in the new constitution was viable, and the econ­
omy was well on its way to steady growth.
The final area to be investigated is the reasons
why the N.L.C.was able to meet their commitments. As
100
noted by Feit, Gutteridge and others, the military in
97Africa Rcoort January, 1968 p.42
98
Africa Report March I968 p.33
99
Africa Report March I968 p.33
100
E. Feit,"Military Coups in Ghana and Nigeria"
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Ghana was able to gain the support of groups such as
the bureaucracy, the middle class and the intelligentsia,
groups which had been excluded from positions of power
in the Nkrumah regime. Furthermore, the N.L.C. was able
to retain this support by acting in co-operation with
these groups, especially the bureaucracy. Second, the
N.L.C. took over a citizenry which had been highly
politicized, and which was highly unified, exhibiting
few divisive characteristics such as inter-tribla con-
101
flict or regional identification. Third, there were 
few requirements for actions of a highly political 
nature, that is, that required compromise. The primary 
problems which the N.L.C. had to face had been economic; 
this meant that economic or administrative methods 
could be used to solve the problems,and political side- 
effects could be ignored. The second problem, the C.P.P., 
was also handled on an administrative basis, with the 
judiciary being the means of ensuring support for the 
actions taken. All other matters were handled on an 
administrative basis, with the priorities of the goals 
being the determinant of the methods. Finally, the 
N.L.C. was able to utilize the common distrust of pol-
100(cont.)
World Politics XX(1,196?) pp.181 and 192. W.F.
Gutteridge, Military in African Politics(London:Methuen, 
19&9)pp.119-125.
101
Austin, "Saviour with a Sword"p.22
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iticians to maintain its rule until such time as the 
mechanism for the return to civilian rule had been 
developed» In Ghana, the bureaucratic-military alliance 
was maintained by the two way support of the military 
utilizing the expertise of the bureaucracy, and the 
bureaucracy proving its worthiness to the military by 
the successful handling of the problems facing the 
government.
In sum, it appears that the N.L.C. was able 
to attain the goals it had set for itself because of the 
nature of the goals, and the means used to attain them. 
Each of the goals was basically operational, and in the 
Ghanaian context, non-controversial. The methods empl­
oyed were basically administrative, and allowed the 
bureaucracy to be fully employed in all facets of 
problem-solving. It was not necessary for the N.L.C. 
either to use existing political groups or to establish 
new political groups to extend and maintain its regime, 
since the civil service was able to perform this function. 
Finally, it may be that the military rulers, since they 
were planning on a return to civilian rule, may have 
wished to keep the politicians who would take over free 
from the stigma caused by the unpopularity of the aus­
terity moves, keeping them in the background.
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In Nigeria, the patterns which were slmillar to 
the Ghanaian experience during the first six months 
of military rule did not lead to similiar patterns of 
relations in the maintenance of the military regime.
The assessment of the Nigorian situation can he accom­
plished by comparing Nigeria's basic problems, commit­
ments and support patterns to the Ghanaian experience. 
In this way, the reasons for the changes in the patterns 
of military government can be examined in the context 
of the commitments made.
The basic Nigerian problem, unlike Ghana's,
stemmed from the basic structure of the state. This
102
structure had allowed little room for maneuvering at 
the federal level due to the predominance of power in 
the regions, and the disparities involved. This meant 
that the northern region would be in a dominant pos­
ition in the federal government, being the largest re­
gion. Contributing to this dominance was the copulation
103
factor. The population of the northern region was 
nearly equal,or more than, the population of the rest 
of Nigeria. This meant that the dominant party in the
102
By maneuvering is meant the possibility of 
shifting alliances between groups to gain control of the 
government.
103
On regionalism, see O.Awolowo,Lb--^hts on the 
Nigerian Constitution(London*Oxford UnicefJiCv Press,1966) 
PP.23-2Ü. Also H. Carol"The Making of Nigerians Political 
Regions" Journal of Asian and African Studies 2(4,1967)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
north would be the dominant party In the Federation,
The second contributor factor was the problem of oth-
104
nicity or tribalism. Because of this factor, the
lack of maneuvering room received much more sinister
overtones, with the northern dominance being regarded
as a Hausa-Fulani dominance, and giving any move to
reduce this dominance implications of an inter-tribal
conflict. The third contributory factor was the lack
105
of a national identity, which removed the framework 
within which these other problems could be worked out. 
This lack of national identity meant that anyone who 
attacked the state because of its shortcomings would 
be in turn attacked on the basis of his regionnl
background, not his motives.
As can be seen, each of these problems was 
closely related to the others, and each was more com­
plex in nature than Ghana's had been. This is not to 
say that Nigeria did not have any other problems. Like 
Ghana, corruption and the waste of funds for prestige
104
On tribalism, see R.L. Sklar,"Nigerian Politics 
in Perspective" Government and Onnosition 2(4,196?) pp.
524—539® Also C « l7c;;<ura ''N ev/ I l o p e  i ’o x ' Nigeria" R o cl Tab 1 o
(230,1968) ppl2?-136 ' "'
105
See Carol"Political Regions" and D.J. Murray, 
"Nigeria After Biafra" Current History 58(343,19?0)nnl35-l4l,
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projects were also problems in Nigeria. Unlike Ghana, 
the overall economic situation was bright, although 
regional disparities did exist. These economic 
problems, however, were minor compared to the more 
basic problems of restructuring Nigeria on a more viable 
basis.
Prom the discussion of the complexities involved, 
the reasons for the failure of General Ironsi *s Decree 
3 4(1966) can be appreciated. As previously mentioned, 
this decree unified the structure of Nigeria. This 
unitary concept had been central to the Ironsi regime's 
concept of Nigeria. However, the attempt to implement 
this by an executive instrument formulated in confer­
ence with senior bureaucrats and military leaders led 
to political unrest and, threats of secession in the 
horth and west. In effect, the attempt to build a new 
structure without first changing the political base 
of the country, and solving some of the above mentioned 
problems, allowed politicians in the north to play on 
the fears and tribal distrust of the people, leading
106
to riots, massacres and the second coun.
The same problems existed for the Gov/on govern-
106
W.A.E.Skurnik"Nigeria in Crisis" Current His­
tory 52(309,1967) ppl42-l48. Also B.J. Dudley Parties and 
Politicians in Northern Nigeria(London:F . Cass&Go.,I968T" 
pp.x-xi.
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ment, with the problems of regionalism, tribalism and 
the lack of a national identity magnified by the events 
of the Ironsi regime. However, these problems were 
approached in quite a different fashion from that which 
General Ironsi had favoured. To solve the overall pro­
blem of maintaining the viability of the Nigerian state, 
the first problem to be approached was that of the 
structure of the post-military government. To this end. 
Chiefs Awolowo and Enaharo, and fifteen other prominent 
political figures were released from detention on August 
2,1966 aad August 4,1966. , Many of these were taken 
into the government's advisory councils. On September
12,1966, these political figures, and others from the 
regions, joined in a conference on the country's future 
constitution. The purpose of this conference,which met 
in Lagos, was the fashioning of a political structure 
for Nigeria which would take into account the factors 
mentioned above, and could be of any form, except the 
unitary. Also excluded were the options of continuing 
the military government, and the complete break-up of
107
the country. In October, I966, this conference pro- 
duced an interim report which favoured a federal syctcm, 
but made no recommendations as to either the number of 
states or the division of powers in the federation.
107
New.York Times 13 September,I966
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These were left to negotiation between the regions and 
the military government. While this conference was in 
session, however, relations between the central govern­
ment and the government of eastern region had deter­
iorated. The governor of the region refused to allow 
the delegates from the region to return to Lagos after 
the recess ended in October. Because of this boycott,
the conference was adjourned indefinitely on November
108
16,1966.
On November 20, I966, General Gowon stated 
that Nigeria would remain a federation of between eight 
and fourteen states. Relations between the east and 
the central government continued to deteriorate, with 
many statements that the central government w a s .again 
trying to force a new form for Nigeria on the regions. 
The estrangement continued, culminating on May 30,1967, 
with the secession of the eastern region. On the same 
day. General Gowon issued the twelve state decree, 
which may have been either causal or resultant of the 
secession. This is based on the supposition that there 
would have been consultation between Gowon and the 
regional governors on the content of the decree.
In form, the twelve state decree,like Général
108
On Record,"NigeriasTribalism against Unity".p.75
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Ironsi’s Decree 34(1966), was an executive instrument# 
However, in content and method of formulation, these 
decrees varied greatly. The decision to create the 
twelve state system was made after public consultation 
with representatives of the four main regions of Nigeria. 
These representatives were mainly * clean'politicians who 
were respected by the members of the region they repres­
ented. Furthermore, the system took into account the 
realities of the Nigerian political system, and attempted 
to correct the structural defects of the old constitu­
tion. By this decree, the minority tribes in the 
various regions were implicitly given their ovm states.
In the eastern region, the minority tribes in the Calabar, 
Ogaja and Port Hareourt provinces were given their own 
states of Rivers and South-Eastern, removing the minor
tribes from the domination of the Ibo, a move requested 
109
prior to 1958* The Yoruba in the north were given the
West-Central state, while other minor tribes were given
the Bene Plateau and Kano states. The moslera tribes were
thus split among the North-Western, North-Central and
110
North-Eastern states.
109
Cf. Carol,"Nigeria Political Regions" p.278 
concerning the C.O.R, proposal to the Minorities Comm­
ission of 1958e
110
Cf. Awolowo, Thoughts *Map* Nigeria : Proposed
States'*.
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With the break-up of the north and east, the 
problem of tribal domination of the Federation was re­
duced. The strength of the tribally-based parties rested 
on the control that they had over large areas of the Fed­
eration. With the reduction of the area of the states, 
this power base was reduced. It also resulted in the pro­
bability that the previous opposition parties such as the 
N.E.P.U. and the United Middle Belt Congress would con­
trol some of the new states in the north, and small par­
ties in the east would, control the new eastern states. 
With this structure, it appears that the problem of flex­
ibility or maneuvering at the federal level was reduced. 
In addition, the problem of the lack of national iden­
tity may have been reduced as well. While identity had 
previously been regional because of the power of the 
regions, the new structure may lead to a centralization
of power in the federal government, and a change in iden-
111
tity from regional to national.
The primary focus here, however, is the nature of
the decision-maker and his advisors. As noted above, the
'clean* politicians played a large role in the formation
of the new structure for Nigeria. The influence of Chief
Awolowo is especially significant, if his proposals and
112
the new structure's actual boundaries are considered.
111
C . begum"New Hope for Nigeria" p.132
112
Awolowo,Thoughts as compared to Africa Report 
October, 196?, pp53-5.5«
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It can bo assumed that, in this case at least, the in­
fluence of the bureaucrat was less that that of the 
politician .
By the end of I968, nine of the new state gov­
ernments were functioning. This expansion created prob­
lems for the military government, since the expansion 
from old to new states necessitated the transfer of 
bureaucrats at a time when competent senior bureaucrats 
were in short supply. This shortage was due to the ex­
odus of senior Ibo bureaucrats during the early months 
of 1967, with the majority of these senior bureaucrats
113
returning to the eastern region. These bureaucrats' 
positions had not been filled, due to the policy of 
holding positions open for them. With this shortage, 
and the demand for civil servants, the drive against 
corruption had to be halted. The problem of inefficient 
state enterprises had been removed by General Ironsi's 
policy of replacing the commissioners with civil servants, 
as noted in Chapter two.
In Nigeria, the commitment was also made to 
return the country to civilian rule as soon as the 
problems had been solved. Thin commitment v^aa made both
114
by General Ironsi and General Gowon. The attaining of
113
Murray,"Nigeria After Biafra" p.139*
114
Economist January 29,1966 and Nigerian Weekly New; 
Review August 12,l9oo,
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success of this commitment depended upon both the success 
of the military government in attaining its goals, and 
the strength of the desire to return rule to the civ­
ilians, Both of these factors can be assessed on the 
basis of the military government's inclusion of civil­
ians in the military government,As mentioned above, 
politicians were brought into the central government at 
an advisory level on the nature of the constitution.
Since this was the basic problem concerning the military 
government, it can be assumed that this meant that the 
military planned for more major roles for the politicians.
This is sunported by the inclusion of civilians in the
115
government at the policy level during the civil war.
As well, the twelve state structure appeared to solve 
the basic problems of Nigeria, and the cessation of the 
civil war in January,1970, completed the drive to maintain 
the integrity of Nigeria. It can be projected that once 
the problems of rehabilitating the war zone are solved, 
the oft stated commitment to return to civilian rule 
will be carried out.
In both Ghana and Nigeria, the initial pattern 
of bureaucratic-military relations was one of close co-
115
For example, the War Cabinet of August 26,19&7 
included four civilians* Awolowo, Enaharo, Elias and 
Arikpo, Keesinvs Contemporary Archiver 19&7 p.21994a
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oration between the bureaucracy and the military at
-'\1 times during the initial period of consolidation.
D"'urlng the subsequent period, however, the patterns
varied. In Ghana, the pattern remained one of close
bureaucratic-ml11tary co-operation. The N.L.C. and the
bureaucracy held dominant positions in the councils of
government, including the economic and executive councils.
116
'those of primary concern. In Nigeria, on the other hand, 
the subsequent-period showed few civil servants in 
prominent positions. In the Federal Executive Council, 
of the fifteen members, only three belonged to the 
security forces. The remainder of the Council was com­
posed of two chiefg(both Action Group loaders), and 
ten other civilians. Of these ten, only one can tenta­
tively be classed a bureaucrat. Dr. J.E. Adetoro, Comm­
issioner for Health, Of the remainder, Dr. T.O. Elias 
had been/Ütourney-General for the Federation for many
years, and was considered a clean politician. Dr. 0.
117
Arikpo was a well known figure in Nigeria. Of the
116
The political committee was disbanded on June 
30,1967 in favour of an independent body formed to 
educate the people in democracy.
117
West Africa Annual 1968 and Africa Report 196?
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118
remainder, two are definitely ex-politicians, while
the other five are well-known figures, probably "clean*
119
ex-politicians from minority parties of other regions.
Each of the commissioners was in full charge of the 
ministry or ministries to which they were appointed, 
with the permanent secretary of the ministry subject 
to the political commissioner.
In the regions, the same held true* Prior to 
July,1968, the regional councils of government contained 
mainly politicians* In keeping with the pattern of the 
central government, these were mainly members of the 
minor or opposition parties responsible for the ministries. 
In addition, the political advisor of the governor of 
the region was the man who had been political governor 
of the region prior to the coup. The position of the 
politicians in the regional government was probably 
exemplified in the extreme in the western region, 
where the politicians were dominant. In this region, 
the decrees of the military governor had to be supported 
by the political commissioners, and Chief Av/olowo, to 
be obeyed. Most of this influence was wielded by the
Action Group loader in the region, Adegbenro, and his
118
A.A. Kano(N.E.P.U.) and J.S. Tarka(U.M.B.C.) 
119
This assumption is based on the familiar way 
in which they are referred to in Nigerian sources, imply­
ing that they were well-known in the south.
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deputies, Onabanjo and Ige. Other politicians in the
government included the leader of the N.C.N.C. in the
120
west and his deputy leader, and one Independent. In the 
north, civilian commissioners consisted of both "clean" 
politicians and the more reputable and liberal emirs 
and chiefs.
After the new state governments became funct^n
ioning governments, it can only bo assumed that the
same situation would occur. With the expansion from
121
three to eleven governments, the problems of setting 
up the new administrations virtually preclude civil 
servants from being used to politically control the 
new states. The civil servants would be faced with the 
problems of transferring power from the old governments 
and would be needed to direct the activities of their 
new departments. Since this would be an area of prime 
concern to the military rulers, it can be assumed that 
the demand would be for politicians to act as organizers 
of support rather than civil servants.
In summation, it appears that the pattern of 
military-bureaucratic relations in Nigeria did vary greatly
120
Africa Confidential Mayl2,1966 
121
Not included are the old eastern regional gov­
ernment or the new east-central state governmnet, since this 
state was, until Jan,13,1970, the "Biafran'stronghold.
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from the Ghanaian pattern. The problems of Nigeria 
seem to have resulted in reputable politicians being 
brought into alliance with the military rulers for the 
purpose of solving the basically political problems of 
Nigeria. It appears, therefore, that in the development 
of this varied pattern of relationships in Nigeria, 
the problems which faced the military governments 
during the period following the coup of July,l966, 
influenced the attitudes of the military, which led to 
the inclusion of the politicians in policy-making 
positions, and the relegating of bureaucrats to lesser 
roles.
T A M  V
Regional, Ethnic or Political Identification
of Nigerians Noted in this Paper____________
Name Position Region
 ___________________ _____________________ Party Tribe
Akintoia,S .A , Premier , We st N.N.D,P . Yoruba
Awolowo,0. Leader A.G, West A.G, Yoruba
Balewa,SirA,T. Prime Minister,Federal. North N.P.C. H.Ft
Bello,Sir A. Premier North N.P.C. H.F*
Enharo ,A. Deputy Leader,A.G. Mid-West A.G. Yoruba
Gowon, General Y. Head of Federal Military
Government July,1966- North Middle Belt
Christian
Ironsi,General A. Head of Federal Military
Government Jan.1966-July,1966 East Ibo
* H.F.- Hausa-Fulani group. h
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Since Ghana and Nigeria have in common a simi­
lar experience with British colonialism, and the bur­
eaucracy and the military in the two countries were 
subjected to similar standards of professionalism, it 
could be expected that the two countries would experience 
similiar pattern of relationships in military govern­
ments. Nevertheless, after the civilian regimes were 
overthrown in the two countries in I966, significantly 
different patterns of relationships among the political, 
bureaucratic and military leadership groups developed 
during the subsequent periods of military government.
In each case, the coup resulted in the removal of civil­
ian politicians from power, and the creation of an al­
liance between the military and the bureaucracy. In 
Ghana, this bureaucratic-military alliance was maintained 
during the entire period of military government. In 
Nigeria, on the other hand, this alliance contributed to 
the downfall of the Ironsi regime, and to the establish­
ment of the subsequent alliance of the military and
76
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political leadership groups^
The crucial difference between the military- 
bureaucratic patterns in the two countries appears 
to bo based on the attitudes which the military hold 
toward politicians. These attitudes seem to bo tho 
result of three dominant factors:
1) the pattern of alienation in the two countries;
2) the patterns of the actual eguu3 d'etat and the 
events of tho immediate post-coup period;
3) the problems facing the military governments.
In Ghana, the patterns of relationships which
resulted from the factors listed was one of close bur^ 
AAUcratic-miIn tary co-operation throughout the period 
of military rule. Tho pattern of alienation prior to the 
coup had been one in which the professional public 
servants had been similiarly estranged by the political 
structure. The political structure was the O.P.P.; tho 
direction of the coup meant the removal of the O.P.P., 
since there were no other political parties In Ghana 
at the time of the coup. The aims of the military gov­
ernment had been the rehabilitation of the economy and 
the restructuring of politics, with a view towards 
the return to civilian rule* That is, the military gov­
ernment may have viewed itself as only transitional, 
performing a necessary technical role to right previous 
imbalances. It would probably not have viewed politio-
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isms as being suited to this short term role, allocating 
to them the more long term political educational role, 
preparatory to the politicians once more taking control. 
In addition, the country had already experienced the 
manner in which an independence party held on to the 
reins of government. The military may have been guard­
ing against a similiar occurrence after the turnover 
of power to the politicians. However, the bureaucracy 
were considered to have a proper role in the government, 
and were alloted a definite legitimate place, handling 
all governmental functions not performed by the N.I.C.,
In the initial period of government, the bureau­
cracy played a highly successful role in the solution 
of the emergency problems facing the military government. 
Also, the bureaucrats were best suited to assist the 
N.L.C. in solving the long-term problems. The primary 
goals of the N.L.C. were to solve the economic problems 
previously described. The H.L.C. expected the bureau­
cracy, as specialists in the area of economics,to perform 
the duties of an advisory body. The nature of the econ­
omic problems meant that no politically explosive issues 
would have to be faced, and the politicians who returned 
to Ghana following the coup could bo left in peripheral 
roles, leaving tho dominant positions to the military 
and the bureaucracy.
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In Nigeria, the interaction of these three factors 
resulted in a different pattern of bureaucratic-military 
relations. During the pre-coup period, alienation in 
Nigeria had been selective, and had varied in Intensity 
within groups in the military and the bureaucracy. The 
military and bureaucratic members from the eastern region 
were the most alienated. Since the coup or mutiny resulted 
in eastern officers dominating the military government, 
and since the coun had been directed against the northern 
politicians who had dominated the federal government, 
politicians would not logically be assigned places in 
the military government. With the eastern dominated 
civil service, the bureaucrats were assigned full part­
nership in the governing of the country, a move attrib­
utable either bo ethnicity or necessity. Furthermore, 
the Ironsi government had a conception of the problems 
facing Nigeria which did not include a role for tho 
politician. As a highly alienated group, the eastern 
military leaders had a view that the problems of Nigeria 
could be solved by unifying the state,altering the 
ructure to exclude the corrupt politician, and elim­
inating the source of the politicians"power, the regions.
In the destruction of the politicians" power, the bureau­
crats would appear to the military as those best suited 
to assist in the aim.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
The Gowon government, on the other hand, was 
composed of those less alienated by the politicians, 
and who had a higher conception of the role of the 
politician in government. The second coup had an effect 
on the conception of the role of the bureaucrat. The 
failure of the Ironsi regime, evidenced by the unrest 
and riots of May and June,l966, was detrimental to the 
image of the military government as that best able to 
solve Nigeria’s problems. Since the bureaucrats were 
closely allied with the Ironsi regime, this would be 
regarded as a failure on the part of the bureaucracy as 
well. This failure would restrict the role which the 
military government would be willing to assign to the 
bureaucrats.
A further influence on the changes in roles 
assigned by the Gowon government oanhbe.linked to the 
new government's conception of the problems facing the 
country. By the failure of the unification decree, it 
was evident that a unified state was not the answer to 
Nigeria's problems. Because of the diversity of the 
country, it appeared evident that a federation was the 
only other answer. Further, the reaction to the unification 
decree had demonstrated the politically explosive nature 
of the problem. Since the bureaucracy had failed to 
perform the role assigned to it by the Ironsi regime.
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by not advising the government of this political aspect, 
the Gowon government co-opted experts in the field of 
politics into its ranks. However, in order that the 
alienated groups would not have further cause for dis­
satisfaction, the 'clean* politicians were used rather 
than the previously powerful governmental leaders.
Although the nature of the problems facing the 
military governments appears the key factor to the 
explanation of the different attitudes, the other two 
factors were contributory. The patterns of alienation, 
the events of the actual coups and the events of the 
immediate post-coup period were instrumental in defining 
the boundaries from which the military could co-opt 
support. That is , because of these two factors, the 
military's choice of supporting groups was restricted, 
with the actual choice being determined by the problems 
facing the military, and the military's conception of 
those best suited to the solution of the problems at 
hand.
It therefore appears that the most important 
factor affecting the variation in patterns of relation­
ships was the nature of the problems facing the mil­
itary governments. In Ghana,the economic problems domin­
ated, with the political problems being only a minor 
segment of the overall patterns. Therefore the military 
could maintain its alliance with the bureaucracy, and
..&ÈL
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relegate the politicians to minor roles until the process 
of returning to civilian rule had been initiated.
In Nigeria, on the other hand, the problems had been 
predominately political in nature. Because the bureau­
crats could not fill roles which were both political and 
controversial, politicians were brought into the military 
government, with the bureaucrats in subsidiary, though 
necessary, positions.
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